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Abstract 
A simultaneous-equations model of loan transactions in rural 
areas is estimated. Results highlight the importance of transaction 
costs affecting both lender and borrower behavior. Interest rate 
effects are insignificant. Risk-related factors condition lender 
rationing behavior, while the borrower's resource endowment is 
important in shaping demand behavior. 
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Transaction Costs of Borrowing and Credit Rationing 
in Agriculture: A Simultaneous-Equations Approach 
1. Introduction 
The role of transaction costs of borrowing as a rationing 
mechanism in agricultural credit markets of less-developed countries 
has been well docmnented in recent research..!/· Financial interme-
diaries circumvent market regulations through non-price mechanisms 
that generate transaction costs for lenders and borrowers. It has 
been shown that lenders are constrained by a narrow range of expli-
cit interest rates they could charge on loans, therefore they use the 
selective application of their loan procedures to screen and ration 
out potential borrowers2/, The results of these rationing practices 
are high transaction costs of borrowing, i.e., implicit-pricing, with 
a regressive incidence by loan-size categories. A review of recent 
case studies in five less-developed countries found levels of trans-
action costs as a percent of the loan amount ranging between 1.2% to 
21.7%. Less-extreme levels of average transaction costs varied 
between 3% and 5% of the loan amount, but in all cases the costs 
associated with small loans were found to be considerably higher 
than those corresponding to large loans (Cuevas and Graham, 1984). 
The most recent findings correspond to Honduras, where the average 
level of borrowing transaction costs was almost 5% of the loan 
amount, thus representing a 30-percent "tax" over the explicit 
interest rate charged on loans (16%). 
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To investigate the detenninants of borrowing transaction costs 
previous studies have specified single-equation models for the level 
of transaction costs, with different sets of explanatory. variables on 
the right-hand side of the equation (Alnned, Cuevas). The basic 
assumption underlying these models is that lenders are "price-
setters" of explicit and implicit interest charges. They take as 
given the profile of loan demand such as loan amount, farm size, 
enterprise type, and other characteristics of the borrower that 
indicate the magnitude of risk involved in individual loan trans-
actions. Since explicit-interest rates are constrained to a narrow 
range detennined by financial regulations and/or the sources of funds 
with which lenders operate, credit rationing will be exercised pri-
marily through implicit-price (transaction costs) adjustments 
(Cuevas). It has been found that borrowing transaction costs, as a 
percent of the loan amount, decrease with increases in loan size, 
decline when the explicit interest r~te increases, and differ between 
lending institutions (Cuevas). Other variables that appear to be 
significant are associated with the social and political status of 
the borrower in the community (Ahmed). 
Even under a price-setting analytical framework, the specifi-
cation of the loan amount as a pre-determined variable on the right-
hand side of the transaction costs function is questionable. Instead 
this amount may be considered a point on the borrower's demand for 
liquidity. If it is also assumed that borrowers do consider trans-
action costs as part of the loan total price, then the model should 
be specified as a system of simultaneous equations in which trans-
action costs and loan amount are endogenous variables. Furthermore, 
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if the true model involves a loan-demand function where the loan 
amount depends on the magnitude of transaction costs, the single-
equation estimation of a transaction costs function would yield 
biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters in the model. 
In this paper we investigate the role and determinants of trans-
action costs under a simultaneous-equations approach. We show that 
this approach contributes to a better understanding of the rationing 
role that transaction costs play in credit markets. We also show that 
several risk-related characteristics of the borrower are important 
determinants of the magnitude of transaction costs imposed by the 
lender. On the other hand, the borrower's resource endo't\ment is a 
significant factor affecting his/her demand for liquidity. The 
following section sets forth the model to be estimated using a simul-
taneous-equations technique. We then present the results of this 
estimation and test the main hypotheses associated with the model. 
Major conclusions follow. 
2. Simultaneous-Equations Model and Estimation. 
The model is specified under the price-setting framework des-
cribed in the previous section, with transaction costs and loan 
amount as endogenous variables. Loan demand is asstnned a function of 
the total cost of borrowing (interest rate and transaction costs), 
and the resource endo~ent that influences the potential size of the 
individual's investment projects (Jaffee and Russell). Some limi-
tations of this specification are discussed in the next section. 
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The exogenous variables that enter the transaction-costs equa-
tion are: (a), the explicit interest rate charged on loans, whose 
range is limited by financial authorities; (b), a set of risk-related 
characteristics of the borrower that are a part of the ~nform.ation 
gathered by the lending institution, namely the area of the farm, the 
previous repayment record of the client, and the type of collateral 
associated with the loan transaction; and (c), the nature of the 
existing bank-client relationship as measured by the length of period 
during which the client has held deposit accounts with the lending 
institution. A dummy variable_ is included to capture differences 
between lending institutions (private banks versus development bank). 
The exogenous variables in the loan-demand equation are: (a), the 
explicit-interest rate; and (b), a group of variables that reflect 
the borrower's resource endo~ent. These variables are the area of 
the farm, the total number of hired workers, and the size of the herd 
of cattle. 
The two equations in the model can now be specified. The 
transaction cost equation is written as follows: 
where, 
TC is borrowing (non-interest) transaction costs, in percent, 
Lis loan amount, 
i is the explicit-interest rate charged on the loan, 
A is the area of the farm, 
COL is a dummy variable for the type of collateral, 
COL=l if collateral is real estate, COL=O, otherwise, 
·. 
, 
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DEL is a dtnnmy variable for the previous repayment performance 
of the borrower, 
DEL=l if delinquent at any time in the past, 
DEL=O, otherwise, 
CLI is the ntnnber of months the client has held deposit accounts 
with the lending institution, and 
BANK is a dtnnmy variable for type of lending institution, 
BANK=! if private bank, BANK=O if development bank. 
The loan-demand equation is written as follows: 
where the variables not yet defined are: 
LAB, the total ntnnber of hired workers computed as a weighted 
Stllll of permanent workers plus temporary workers, and 
CAT, the total ntnnber of units in the cattle herd. 
(2) 
The estimation of this two-equation system drew upon data ob-
tained in a survey undertaken in Honduras in August 1983. The sample 
included some 400 observations of farmer-borrowers in the seven 
major agricultural regions of the country. About half of the obser-
vations correspond to clients of the agricultural development bank, 
and the other half to borrowers from private banks. The estimation 
techniques used were two-stage least squares (2SLS), limited-
information maximtnn-likelihood (LIML), and three-stage least squares 
(3SLS). The results presented in the following section correspond to 
the 2SLS estimation. The use of LIML or 3SLS did not improve either 
the overall goodness-of-fit or the significance of individual coeffi-
cients in the mode13/. 
# 
- 6 -
3. Results and Implications 
The estimated parameters and significance levels of _the two 
equations in the system are reported in table 1. Overall, R-square 
levels are rather low but not unusual for cross-sectional data sets. 
Discussion of individual coefficients requires some caution since in 
both equations there are groups of variables that capture the effect 
of single "factors", i.e., risk in the transactions-costs equation, 
and resource endowment in the loan-demand equation. These variables 
are thus likely to be correlated among themselves, therefore their 
individual effects will not be statistically significant due to 
multicollinearity. In these cases the appropriate joint tests for 
the relevant group of coefficients are presented in table 2, together 
with other relevant tests involving more than one individual 
estimate. 
The first important finding shown in table 1 is the significance 
of transaction costs in the loan-demand equation. Loan amount is in-
versely related to the magnitude of transaction costs, whereas the 
estimated coefficient for the interest-rate variable is not signi-
ficantly different from zero. If the "total-price" elasticity is 
defined as the sum of the estimated coefficients for interest rate 
and transactions costs, its estimated value is -0.6, not statis-
tically different from zero as shown by the F-test reported in table 
2. These results indicate that transaction costs are indeed playing 
the role of price signals in loan transactions. Explicit-interest 
rates do not appear to affect the behavior of lenders or borrowers, 
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Table 1. Estimated Parameters of the Transaction-Costs Equation 
and the Loan-Demand Equation. Two-Stage Least-Squares. 
Jointly-Dependent Variables 
(1) (2) 
Transaction Costs 
(ln TC) 
Right-Hand 
Side Variables 
Asymptotic 
Estimate t-ratio 
Loan Amount (ln L) 
Transaction Costs (ln TC) 
Interest Rate (ln i) 
Area of the Farm (ln A) 
Type of Collateral (COL) 
Delinquency Status (DEL) 
Bank-Client· 
Relationship (CLI) 
Banking Institution 
(BANK) 
Hired Labor (LAB) 
Cattle (CAT) 
Intercept 
R2 
F-Value 
N = 341 
Significance levels: *, .01 
+, . 05 
0, .10 
0.2970 
.0. 2387 
-0.3661 
0.1675 
0.1944 
-0.0012 
-0.9165 
-0.8853 
0.1357 
7.47* 
0.6979 
0.5211 
-2.0326+ 
0.7807 
1.2093 
-1. 2111 
-1. 7755° 
-0.2781 
Loan Amount 
(ln L) 
Asymptotic 
Estimate t-ratio 
-1. 5840 -4.4807* 
0.9842 1.5642 
-0.1084 -o. 7113 
0.0012 1. 2620 
0.0019 2.7668* 
7.5460 4.0241* 
0.2206 
18.97* 
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since the corresponding coefficients are not statistically signi-
ficant in either equation. Our interpretation of this result is that 
the limited range within which interest rates can vary is_ too narrow 
to elicit any meaningful response by the participants in_ the market. 
Table 2. Tests of Significance of Different Joint Effects in the 
Transaction-Costs and Loan-Demand Equations. 
Factor, Null Hypothesis 
Transaction-Costs Equation, 
Effect of Risk-related 
characteristics 
Ho: b =b =b =O 1 2 3 
Loan Demand Equation, 
Effect of "Total Price" 
Ho: c1+c 2=o 
Effect of Resource 
Endowment 
Ho: d =d =d =O 1 2 3 
F-Value 
2.8046 
0.6795 
Conclusion 
(significance level) 
Ho rejected (.03) 
Ho not rejected (.41) 
Ho rejected (.03) 
The joint effect of risk-related characteristics of the borrower 
is highly significant, as shown in table 2. This suggests that a 
major consideration in lenders' decisions towards the selective applica-
tion of loan procedures is the perceived degree of risk associated 
with the loan application. Loan amount was not a significant vari-
able, an unexpected result considering the findings reported in 
earlier studies. A possible explanation is provided by the estimated 
'\ 
• 
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effects of the bank-client relationship and the banking institution 
in question(see table 1). The signs of the estimated coefficients are 
negative in both cases, though only the bank variable is_ significant. 
As reported elsewhere, the average loan size borrowed from private 
banks was five times as large as those obtained from the development 
bank (Cuevas and Graham, 1985). Also, there is a positive and signi-
ficant correlation between loan amount and the age of deposit 
accounts held by the borrower with the lending institution. These 
relationships suggest that these two variables, bank-client rela-
tionship and banking institution, are capturing the expected cost-
decreasing effect of increasing loan amounts. 
Even though the survey was not specifically designed to thor-
oughly document the resource endowment of farmer-borrowers, the 
variables specified in the loan-demand equation to capture this 
effect performed well. As indicated before, individual coefficients 
were not expected to be significant since the different components of 
the resource endowment are expected to be highly correlated among 
themselves. In fact only the "cattle" variable was individually 
significant, however the joint test for all three components indi-
cates that resource endowment is a relevant determinant of the demand 
for liquidity. An important note here is that liquidity is not 
demanded solely for "investment purposes" as suggested by the speci-
fication used in this model. Liquidity will indeed be allocated to 
all "rewarding" uses, in terms of utility derived from consumption 
or under the form of returns to investment. Therefore an improved 
specification of the loan-demand equation should include variables 
that capture the effect of the current-expenditure side of the 
• 
• 
• 
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potential uses of liquidity (e.g., family size, education), in 
addition to those that determine the potential size of investment 
project (i.e., resource endownent). 
4. Swmnary and Conclusions 
Previous studies of borrowers transactions costs have been 
couched in single equation terms. This approach assumes that the 
loan amount demanded is fixed and exogenously given and operates 
only on the lenders behavior towards the borrower. However, this 
variable also reflects borrower behavior towards the optimum amount 
to borrow, an effect not considered in the single equation approach. 
Therefore we hypothesize that borrower loan demand can be influenced 
by the transactions costs incurred in negotiating the loan and the 
resource endowment of the borrower. Hence a two equations 
simultaneous system is more appropriate in capturing these dual 
effects of lender and borrower behavior. 
Our results highlight the importance of transaction costs in 
affecting both lender and borrower behavior. Interest rate effects 
are insignificant. Risk related characteristics stand out as 
important factors conditioning lender loan rationing behavior while 
the resource endowment played a comparably significant ·role in 
shaping borrower behavior. Future studies should attempt to refine 
the loan demand specification to include variables that capture the 
effects of potential uses of liquidity for expenditures (in addition 
to investments). In the end the importance of non-interest 
• 
• 
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transaction costs stands out as a strategic variable 1n lender and 
borrower behavior in rural financial markets. 
Notes 
1/ Ahmed, Cuevas, Cuevas and Graham (1984). 
2/ On these issues see Baltensperger, Benston and Smith, Jaffee and 
Russell. 
3/ Overall survey results and descriptive analysis are reported 1n 
Cuevas and Graham (1985). 
') 
.. 
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